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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15786

-vsREX GLEN FOUST,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged by information with
Incest, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-102 (1953), as amended,
a felony of the third degree.

The information alleged that

he had sexual intercourse with a person he knew to be an
ancestor or descendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was

t~ied

and convicted by a

ju~y

on November 15, 1977, in the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Davis County, before the Honorable J. Duffy
Palmer.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the jury
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testimony of the victim, Kathryn Foust, was
not controverted at trial.

The victim was the step-daughter

of the appellant, and was legally adopted by him when she
was eight years of age (T.5).

The incident complained of

took place shortly before Christmas of 1976 (T.6), when
the victim was sixteen years of age (T.4).
About a week and a half prior to a dance at
Viewmont High School, the victim approached her mother
to seek permission to attend the dance (T. 7) •

The victim's

mother told her she would have to ask her step-father
(T.7).

Sometime later, while the victim and her step-

father were in the kitchen doing dishes, the victim sought
her step-father's permission to attend the dance (T.8).
At that time, the other members of the family were not
in the house (T. 8) •

After asking the victim "how bad she

wanted to go" to the dance (T. 8), the appellant approached
the victim and began fondling her breasts while she was
at the sink doing the dishes

(T.9).

The victim moved

away, but the appellant approached her again (T.9).

At

that point he asked if she "wanted to play."

The

(T. 9) •

victim responded that she did not, and the appellant angril;'
left the room (T.9,10).

She again asked the appellant in

-2-
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the living room if she could attend.

He said no, and

responded in part by again placing his hand on her
breast(T.10).

The appellant again inquired if she

"wanted to play."

(T.11).

After repeating her request

to go to the dance, and being told no, the victim
accompanied the appellant to his bedroom, where the
sexual intercourse occurred (T.11).
The victim testified that on several occasions
she was admonished not to tell anyone about the incident,
because of the effect it would have on her mother-and her
family (T.21).
At trial, the victim was the only witness, who
testified during the State's case in chief.

The appellant

offered three witnesses, two of whom knew him only at
work (T.25,27).

The third witness testified that his

reputation for moral standards in the community was good
(T. 22).
The State then offered a witness in rebuttal,
who testified that the appellant and the victim's
mother moved to Maryland at one point and lived together
before they were married (T.38).
At the close of the State's case in chief, the
appellant moved for a dismissal on the theory that the

-3-
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victim was an accomplice, and that her uncorroborated
testimony was insufficient to warrant a conviction
(T.19,45).

It is the denial of that motion that

brings this case before the Court.
Respondent calls the Court's attention to a
misstatement of the facts in appellant's brief at
page 4, lines 2, 3 and 4.

The transcript (T.19,20)

does not reflect that at the time the judge denied the
motion to dismiss, he also entered a guilty judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD VICTIM
OF INCEST CANNOT BE AN ACCOMPLICE.
The issue presented by this appeal, whether a
sixteen year old female can legally consent to or be an
accomplice to the crime of incest, has not been addressed
by this Court since the Utah Criminal Code was amended
in 1973.
The crime of incest presents unique problems in
that it is a serious crime usually committed in the privacy
of the home with no witnesses, thus making corroboration
of the victim's testimony most difficult.

Also, a child's

-4-
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concern for family security and respect for parental
authority often result in the child's silent submission
to such a crime.

The usually concomitant facts present

in rape, such as torn and disarranged clothing, wounds
and bruises, or outcries, neither necessarily nor ordinarily
appear.
Incest is not a common law crime.

It was punished

by the ecclesiastical courts of England as an offense
against good morals.

Therefore, the crime of incest is

purely statutory.
Prior to the revision of the Utah Criminal Code,
which became effective in 1973, the crime of incest and
adultery were included in a general grouping of crimes
entitled sexual offenses, which included, among other
crimes, rape and sodomy.
repealed, stated:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-53-19 (1953),

"Any person who carnally and unlawfully

knows any female over the age of thirteen years and under
the age of eighteen years is guilty of a felony."

In

line with this statute are numerous cases holding that a
female under the age of eighteen could not consent to an
act of illicit sexual intercouse.

State v. Wade, 241 Pac. 838

(Utah 1925); State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 Pac. 215
(1900).
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In the new draft of the code, the section on
carnal knowledge was omitted entirely.

In addition,

the legislature saw fit to distinguish the crimes of
incest, bigamy, and adultery from the crimes of unlawful
sexual intercourse, rape, sodomy, forcible sexual
abuse, and aggravated sexual assault by placing them in
Chapter 7 of Title 76, entitled Offenses Against the
Family.

The latter crimes are included in Chapter 5 of

Title 76, Offenses Against the Person.

Although it is

not clear at what age a female can consent to all of the
sexual offenses included in Chapter 5 of Title 76, Section
76-5-401 provides:

"A male person commits unlawful sexual

intercouse if he has sexual intercourse with a female, not
his wife, who is under sixteen years of age."

In addition,

Section 76-5-406(7} states that no victim under the age of
fourteen can consent to sexual intercourse, sodomy or
sexual abuse.

It is significant that no section of

Chapter 7 of Title 76 makes any reference to an age of
consent for crimes against the family.

In view of the

fact that incest is a purely statutory crime, we are
left to speculate as to what the age of consent is as it
applies to incest.

In his brief, the appellant attempts

to borrow the age of consent stated in offenses against the
person.

Nowhere has the legislature indicated that this is
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what it intended to occur.

It is of particular significance

that the age of consent to this crime in Utah has historically
been eighteen years of age, the general age of consent.
However, Professor Wigmore states:
"Whether a participant in an
incestuous relationship is an
accomplice or a victim must depend
upon the facts in each case.
Obviously the relationship will
not submit to a rigid rule.
7
Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940).
Sec. 2060(b) f.n. 7." Lusby v.
State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 '
at 897 (1958).
There is a very real difference between consent and
assent.

Consent refers to a voluntary agreement and implies

some positive action.

Assent "means mere passivity or

submission, which does not include consent."

Lusby at 898.

In the crime of incest, the term accomplice, as it
is generally referred to, does not have a place.

In the

case of father-daughter incest where the act is committed
at the suggestion or the insistence, whether physical or
coercive, of the father, the more appropriate term for the
daughter is a victim.

Her role can hardly be referred to as

one of aggressive participation, but would more safely be
characterized as one of fearful submission to a domineering
figure in her life.

The potentially coercive control of a

father upon a daughter who lives at home cannot be ignored.
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"The cooperation in the crime must be real--not merely
apparent," before a person can be deemed an accomplice.
State v. Hornaday, 122 Pac. 322 at 323 (Wash. 1912).
The Kentucky court, in Kinslow v. Carter,
282 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1955), referred to the daughter as
a victim, not an accomplice.

" • • • In cases involving

incest between a father and his minor daughter, the
presumption is that the daughter involuntarily participated
in the sexual intercourse. • • • "

282 S. W. 2d at 144.

The

California courts have also taken note of the consentassent distinction.
101 (C.A. 1932).

People v. Conklin, 10 P.2d 98 at

The evidence in this case, which was

not challenged, is that the father, after making indecent
advances to his daughter, conditioned her attendance at
the school dance on her willingness to engage in incestuous
conduct.

Under these circumstances, even though no violent

force was used to gain submission, the more likely conclusic
is that the daughter passively assented to the act.

The

mere fact that she was presented with a choice does not fori
the conclusion that her submission indicated consent.

T~

choice and her decision reflect nothing more than her
moral immaturity.

In view of the victim's lack of consent:

-8-
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the commission of the crime, she cannot be deemed an
accomplice.
a victim.

The more appropriate term is that she was
The trial judge, in denying the defendant's

motion (T.19) to dismiss at the close of the State's
case, in effect ruled that the victim, in light of
the evidence presented, was not an accomplice.
This court recently had the opportunity to
discuss the statute, Section 78-31-18, which appellant
asserts supported his motion to dismiss, in State v. Helm,
563 P.2d 794

(Utah 1977).

In that appeal, as in the

present case, the appellant viewed the evidence in a light
most favorable to his position.

This is done in contradiction

of the general rule of law that on appeal the evidence must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

This

Court, in determining the propriety of the trial judge's
denial of the motion to dismiss, must view the evidence
presented as to the victim's assent in the light most
favorable to the victim.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that the
victim consented to the act, this Court must then also
determine that the victim could have been indicted for the
offense herself.

"The general test to determine whether a

witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have
been indicted for the offense • • • If he could not have been
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so indicted, he is not an accomplice."
There is no statutory definition

19 A.L.R. 2d 1354,

of an accomplice in Utah,

"but the court has construed the word to refer to one who
is or could be charged as a principal with the defendant
on trial."

State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458

at 461 (1937).

The court also defined an accomplice in

State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P<tc. 203 at 204 (1929),
as one

• who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common

intent with the principal offender, unites in the
corrunission of the crime.

The cooperation in the crime

must be real, not merely apparent."
Ann. § 76-2-202

See also Utah Code

(Supp. 1977), and State v. Davie, 240

P.2d 263 (Utah 1952); State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347
(Utah 1951); and Helm, supra.

"The burden of proving

the witness to be an accomplice is • • • upon the party
alleging it. •
§

2060(e).

"

7 Wigmore on Evidence(3d ed. 1940),

Under the test presented in Coroles, supra,

the defendant has not shown that the victim acted voluntaril
or with a corrunon intent.
Another problem presented by the defendant's
claim that the victim is an accomplice is the fact that
under Utah law she could not have been criminally punished
for her role in the act, even if she had given her conse~
and was old enough to do so.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16
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(1953), as amended, states:
"Except as otherwise provided
by law, the [juvenile] court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction
in proceedings:
(1) concerning any
child who has violated any federal,
state, or local law or ordinance, or
any person under 21 years of age who
has violated any such law or
ordinance before becoming eighteen
years of age, regardless of where
the violation occurred."
If the victim had been charged with incest in any other
court, that court would have had to transfer the· case to
the juvenile court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-18
(1953), as amended, and the juvenile court would then
proceed under the act.

Incest is a third degree felony;

therefore, the juvenile court would have to conduct an
investigation or hearing, and would have to find "that
it would be contrary to the best interests of the child
or of the public to retain jurisdiction," Utah Code Ann.
§

78-3a-25 (1953), as amended, before it could certify

the case to the district court.

There is no indication

in the record that the victim had a prior record of
delinquency or that the case could have been certified
by the juvenile court had she been charged with incest.

In short, she would have been tried in juvenile court,
and the proceeding would have been civil, not criminal
in nature.
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"The theory of the District
Juvenile Court Act, like that of
other jurisdictions, is rooted in
social welfare philosophy rather
than in corpus juris.
Its proceedings are designated as civil
rather than criminal. The Juvenile
Court is theoretically engaged in
determining the needs of the child
and society rather than adjudicating
criminal conduct."
(Emphasis added.)
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
at 554 (1966).
As a practical matter, the victim in this case
would not have been charged with or convicted of incest,
and the test enumerated by the court in Bowman, supra,
and advanced by the appellant in his brief, page 5, is not
met.
This argument reflects not only the fact that the
victim could not be an accomplice, People v. Johnson, 2
P.2d 216 (Cal. 1931), but the policy of the State of Utah
to protect minors from the consequences of criminal acts.
The thrust of this appeal is directed at the
judge's ruling that the victim was not an accomplice.

The

appellant concedes that the question is one of law for t~
judge to determine whether the party could have been prosecul
for the same offense (appellant's brief, pages 5 and 6), an:
therefore be an accomplice.

"It is generally recognized that
whether or not a witness is an uccomplice
is a question of law for the court when
there is no conflict in the evidence in
regard
to the
acts
ofInstitute
the ofwitness
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided
by the
Museum andin
Library Services
connection
with by
the
crime,
or if his
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered
the Utah
State Library.
connection
with
iterrors.
is admitted."
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain
19 A.L.R.2d 1353.

See also State v. Stalker, 151 N.W. 527 (Iowa 1951);
Alexander v. State, 72 S.W.2d 1080 (Texas 1930);
Matherly v. State, 71 P.2d 1094 (Okla. Cr. 1937).
"The essential characteristic of an accomplice is
therefore criminal guilt."
839.

Wade, supra, 838 Pac. at

The effect of the trial judge's ruling on page 45

of the transcript was that the victim here was not an
accomplice.

In view of the uncontradicted testimony at

trial, his ruling was appropriate and should not be
reversed.
POINT II
A DEFENDANT IN AN INCEST CASE MAY BE CONVICTED
ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM.
"It is now an accepted rule of law in Utah that
a conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the victim."
P.2d

State v. Sisneros, No. 15046,

(July 10, 1978); State v. Middelstadt, 579

P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

This holding comports with the

common law rule that "in the trial of offenses against
the chastity of women, the testimony of the prosecuting
witness was sufficient evidence to support a conviction,
and neither another witness nor corroborating circumstances
were necessary."

7 Wigmore Evidence (3d ed. 1940)

§

2061.

Also, State v. Davis, 147 P.2d 940 (Wash. 1944).
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The Kentucky court in Browning v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2di
at 501 (1966), stated:
"This court has consistently
held in a long line of decisions
that under an indictment for
incest committed by a father with
his daughter, a conviction is
authorized upon the testimony of
the daughter alone, she not being
an accomplice."
See also State v. Akers, 328 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1959).
The record in this case is brief; but revealing.
The testimony of the prosecutrix was uncontradicted.

The

facts surrounding the incident that she testified to are
highly believable, and the defendant does not challenge
the fact that the act occurred.

Although he did not testif:
1

at trial, he had ample opportunity to challenge the occum:\
of the act through the cross-examination of the victim.

j

.
.
. i
Cross-examination of the victim revealed no inconsistencies
in her story, nor did it elicit any indication of antagonis:
by the victim towards her stepfather.

Al though the charact 0

evidence presented by the defendant was directed at his
reputation for moral character, two of the character witnessi
admitted that they knew him only at work, and that their
. i

testimony went only to his reputation for truth and veracit:
The unique nature of incest has already been

al~

to, and the fact that the victim chose to remain silent as
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long as she did is not unusual, especially in view of the
admonitions from her father.

It is significant to note

that less than a month after the event she chose to leave
her family.
In State v. Guldin, 162 P.2d 907

(Ariz. 1945),

the Court held that the defendant was properly convicted
on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix and
noted:
"Her story of the act did
not disclose its physical
impossibility, nor was it so
incredible that no reasonable
person could believe it.
[Citations omitted.] This has to be
the rule. Otherwise many offenders
would go unpunished. Acts of the
character involved here are
performed secretly, without the
presence of witnesses. The
character of the act affords
little opportunity, in most cases,
for corroboration. Men do not
advertise acts of this kind."
CONCLUSION
It is not clear under the Utah Criminal Code
whether the victim was legally able to consent to the
act of incest.

Even if she were, the uncontroverted

testimony at trial was sufficient to allow the judge to
rule, as a matter of law, that the prosecutrix was a
victim and not an accomplice.

Therefore, his denial of
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the defendant's motion to dismiss was appropriate, and by
so ruling, the judge negated the need to instruct the
jury on corroboration of an accomplice.

It is the law

in Utah that a conviction may properly be had on the
uncontroverted testimony of the victim.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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